



7th Annual OPFOR Conference



Commander,
HQs U.S. Army
TRADOC

Caspian Overview, 2 April 2002

Contents

Scenario Overview

- **Operational Environment**
- **Situation**
 - **Weather/Terrain/Environmentals**
 - **Friendly Situation (Anfar)**
 - **Current Situation**
 - **Anfar Forces**
 - **Anfar Systems**
 - **Anfar Disposition**
 - **Road To War**
 - **Current Dispositions**

Operational Environment

The Caspian: ripe for conflict - critically important -

presents a complex full spectrum dilemma for use in force design and determining system capabilities

The Strategic Setting

- Regional conflict with strategic consequence....
 - Get It Right = Economic/Political/Military stability
 - Get It Wrong = Potentially Spins out of control
- Competition for scarce, valuable resources... Oil, Gas...
- Ethnic rivalry....Anfar vs. Azerbaijani vs. Iranian vs....
- Religious animosity...Christian vs. Moslem...Suni and Shiite



Crisis Environment - Operational Battlespace

- Sizable AOR with varied geography and weather / diverse terrain
- Austere and deteriorating infrastructure
- Fractured Public Institutions
- Ongoing insurgency
- Significant NGO/IO Presence with 5 million displaced persons
- International and Media Interest

OPFOR

- Thinking, adaptive - - fully understands his battlespace and his enemy!
- Will: exploit perceived vulnerabilities and leverage available technology
 - Deny, limit, interrupt, or delay US entry - allow no sanctuary - employing all
 - Shield by deliberate actions to counter C4ISR and neutralize air & missile force

Operational Dilemma

- Ankar invades to seize and regain lost territory, control resources and force implosion
- Azeri Government - in danger of collapse; military weakened, insurgency threatening



CASPIAN PLAYERS: INTERESTS AND POSITIONS

Russia

- Substantial modern military- forces not available
- Desires stability in region - continued oil flow
- Does not support sustained

Republic of Anfar

- Aggressor- Seeks to incorporate N-K into Greater Anfar
- Received military support from Russia and Iran
- Substantial military capability

Azerbaijan

- Historic Ties to Turkey and Iran
- Weak Conventional Military
- Seek unconditional return of occupied territory
- Unstable political environment
- Austere Infrastructure
- Rich in Natural Gas and Oil

Georgia

- Substantial conventional military- forces not available
- Seeks to avoid major military conflict on Georgian territory
- Wants to maintain independence from Russia
- Wants to expand role as transit country for oil and gas

Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K)


- Self-Proclaimed Independent Republic (1992)
- Seeks unification with Anfar

Turkey


- Substantial conventional military- forces not available
- Desires regional stability
- Seeks to limit Iran's power in region

Iran

- Supports Anfar, Poised to exploit situation
- Substantial modern military forces available
- Large Azeri minority
- Views Azerbaijan as rival for oil/gas
- Seek increased long-term influence



ANFAR



- Supported by Russia and Iran militarily/economically
- Modern military - Well trained and equipped
- Niche Technology prevalent throughout systems
- One OSC in Nagorno-Karabakh
- Insufficient natural resources for food and water
- Energy reserves under development

Communications

- TransAsia-Europe fiber-optic cable through Iran
- Microwave radio relay and landline through M
- By satellite to the rest of the world
 - Satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat

AZERBAIJAN - A DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT

Terrain

- **Complex, Mountainous and Lowlands**
- **Southeast dominated by Kura Lowlands**
- **North and West Dominated by Caucasus Mountains**

Weather

- **Cold (19-33 Degrees F)**
- **Icing and Turbulence**
- **Clouds/Fog**

Communications

- **Fixed telephones in Baku**
- **Cell phone coverage in some areas**

**REPUBLIC OF
ANFAR**

- **Frail government in immediate danger of collapse**
- **Standing Military of 67,000; did not keep pace with region.**
- **Increasingly militant Shia Muslim Insurgencies**
- **Over 20,000 US Oil Workers in/around Baku**
- **Deteriorating infrastructure: roads, rails, airports**
- **Large number of N-K IDPs**
- **Baku overcrowded/largely impoverished**
- **Internal coup in 1999**



















































CLIMATOLOGICAL SUMMARY - CAUCASUS

- Best Weather Season: Summer**
- Weather significantly worsens in October; improves in March**
- Worst Weather Season: Winter (January is worst of the worst)**
- CAUCASUS: Two Triangular depressions in Georgia and Azerbaijan between Black and Caspian Seas divided by Surnam Mountains.**
 - Georgia: Cloudy/Rainy in winter in flow from Black Sea. Warmest winters in European Russia. Mountains to NE block frigid air associated with Siberian High**
 - Azerbaijan: Mild Dry Winters but more variable than Western Trans-Caucasus. Much of region is below mean sea-level but terrain slopes up to west (near Tblisi)**


Azerbaijan - JANUARY


- **Ceilings:** < 2000 ft AGL occur 40% of time; < 1000 ft AGL occur 20% of time; < 200 ft AGL 7% of time (Worse around sunrise; worse in foothills)
- **Visibility:** < 3200m 20% of time in fog; Worse along foothills of eastern Caucuses than Caspian Coast. Snow may drop vsby below 3200m.
- **Winds:** in lowlands from SE. Farther inland winds are from NW at 10-25 kt
- **Precipitation:** Rain/Snow mix or Snow 7-8 days this month. Snow uncommon in lowlands, common in higher terrain (Total liquid equivalent: ~1")
- **Temperatures:** Mostly at/above freezing, but more freeze/thaw cycles than in west. Colder in highlands. Higher winds here cause wind-chills < 32F more than 60% of time; <0 F about 15% of the time (Worse in hills/highlands)
- **Trafficability:** On and Off road - GO; Marginal in uplands (ice/snow/fog)
- **Aircraft Hazards:** Mdt/Svr Turbulence common esp. near hills; Mdt/Svr Icing common with approach of frontal systems

WEATHER EFFECTS ON MILITARY SYSTEMS


| | D | J | F | REASON |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| SEA TRANS |  |  |  | 20-30' Seas in North Atlantic |
| AIR TRANS |  |  |  | APOEs IFR; Few Indigenous Nav aids; In theater Lift (seldom VFR); Surface mobility |
| UAV |  |  |  | |
| STRAT EO |  |  |  | Icing / Turbulence; Cloud/Fog/Contaminants degrade Vis / EO sensors |
| DISMOUNT OPS |  |  |  | Coal/Wood heating / Low sun angle enhance cloud / Fog formation & Persistence |
| MOUNTED OPS |  |  |  | Cold Injuries - Anfar (Avg: 19°F to 33°F in Jan); Loss of dexterity/mobility |
| ARMOR |  |  |  | |
| ARTY |  |  |  | Targeting sensors degraded; Lubricants thicken; On and Off road mobility |
| RADARS |  |  |  | |
| ENGINEER |  |  |  | Targeting sensors degraded; Lubricants thicken; On and Off road mobility |
| CHEM |  |  |  | |
| SIGNAL |  |  |  | GLIDs degraded by low cloud / fog; Lubricants thicken; On and Off-road mobility |
| SCOUT / ATK HELOS |  |  |  | Wind damage & Snow / Ice attenuation on antennas |
| LIFT HELOS |  |  |  | Frozen ground (Anfar); Saturated Ground in Azerbaijan |
| LOW CAS |  |  |  | Persistent in lowlands - cold/calm/stable air; (May be too cold for BIO) |
| HIGH CAS |  |  |  | Wind damage to antennas; Snow/ice attenuation on antennas |
|  MISSIONS IMPACTED >25% OF TIME | | | |  MISSIONS IMPACTED >50% OF TIME |
| | | | | Icing and Turbulence; Cloud/Fog/Contaminants degrade Vis/EO sensors; Few Indigenous Nav aids for In-theater Lift (no VFR) |

DISTRIBUTION





CASPIAN OIL PIPELINE ROUTES



Azerbaijan Transportation

Railways:

total: 2,125 km in common carrier service; does not include industrial lines

broad gauge: 2,125 km 1.520-m gauge (1,278 km electrified) (1993)

Highways:

total: 24,981 km

paved: 23,057 km

unpaved: 1,924 km (1998 est.)

Pipelines: crude oil 1,130 km; petroleum products 630 km; natural gas 1,240 km

Ports and harbors: Baku (Baki)


Merchant marine:

total: 55 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 248,155 GRT/304,215 DWT


ships by type: cargo 12, petroleum tanker 40, roll-on/roll-off 2, short-sea passenger 1 (1999 est.)

AZERBAIJAN - Major and Secondary Roads


updated by ReliefWeb: 7.6.96




MAP




AZERBAIJAN CELL PHONE COVERAGE



NGO ORGANIZATIONS IN AZERBAIJAN




AZERBAIJAN INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS



Kura Araks Lowland


Kura Araksinskaya Nizmennost (Kura Araks Lowland)

Large depression between the Caucasus and Malyy Kavkaz (Little Caucasus) mountain ranges, includes the Kura and Araks rivers. The lowland has a dry, subtropical climate and contains oil fields.




Araks River - fast and unnaviga

Poor cover and concealment enroute
Combination of agricultural and industrial areas
Kura and Araks Rivers primary natural obstacles
Lowlands heavily irrigated..numerous canals




Eastern Karabach Region



Agdam on slight plateau above Kura-Araks lowland
Xankandi (capital of Nagorno Karabach) 20 k SW of Agdam
Little Caucasus Mountains begin immediately to the West of Agdam
Irrigation systems less prevalent south of Agdam

UXO and Mine Contamination Map



AGDAM DISTRICT



Territory 1154 sq.km
Population 58000
Villages and settlements
122


Dwelling houses 24446
Industrial companies 48
Schools 160
Health care centers 65
Cultural establishments 373

Mosques 3

Agdam



Mostly one - two story buildings
Several 5-8 story apartment buildings
Hard packed unimproved roads
Trees and undergrowth restrict LOS




Casualty Producing Terrain

75% of the city is occupied



Agdam Mosque





Scene of ethnic cleansing by Anfari troops
Slowly rebuilding after 1993 war 15k to 20k pop
Numerous NGOs in area
Unmarked minefields throughout area

SE of Agdam Terrain

Upper Karabakh Canal

Numerous Irrigation canals
may restrict ground
movement

Uncultivated agricultural
fields
provide excellent fields
of fire from villages and
orchards
(Apples And
Pomegranates)



Orchards with heavy undergrowth restrict vehicle
maneuver and provide cover and concealment for
ground troops

NAGORNO-KARABAKH INTERNAL LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (NKILO)

Composition:

- Former residents of Nagorno-Karabakh—now in AZ
- Islamists playing on Shia sympathies—appealing to the “downtrodden” and those who oppose the corrupt AZ government
- Exact numbers unknown—believed to be several thousand






Objectives:

- Overthrow of the “corrupt” AZ government
- Supportive Government in BAKU
- NK in hands of its rightful citizenry

Strategy:










- Focus world attention on the NKILO cause
- Aggravate the ANFAR / AZ situation to create world support for NKILO cause
- Support/oppose either ANFAR or AZ for short-term political or military advantage

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC COMMANDS (OSC)



See separate Line & Block chart for more detail


5th OSC



Airfields and Landing Zones


 Airfield

 Landing Zone



ANFAR ANTI-ACCESS CAPABILITY

REGIONAL UAV COVERAGE



GLOBAL SPF COVERAGE

S-400 SAM
400 KM

CRUISE MISSILE
COVERAGE TO 3000 KM



REPUBLIC OF ANFAR

WEREWOLF
300 KM

UPIR TBM
1000 KM



- Only 2 Major SPODs in Georgia, 1 in Azerbaijan
- Only 2 Major APODs in Azerbaijan; 10,000 feet... 1 in Georgia
- < 5000 miles heavy duty paved roads in

ANFAR FORCE COMBAT SYSTEMS

| Weapon | |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| Armor | Chieftain |
| Artillery | 2S3, 2S9, 2S19 |
| Rockets | BM-21, 9A52, 9P140 |
| SAMs | Crotale, SA-13, Stinger |
| Helicopters | Hind-F |
| IFV | BMP-2, AMX-10, BRM |
| APC | BTR-80 |
| Anti-Tank | MT-12, M40A1, Carl Gustaf |
| Gun / Msl | AT-5, AT-9, AT-13 |
| TBM | SS-21, Scud-B |

ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES

- **Control access to the region.**
- **Change the nature of the conflict.**
- **Employ operational shielding.**
- **Control tempo.**
- **Neutralize technological overmatch.**
- **Cause politically unacceptable casualties.**
- **Allow no sanctuary.**

**Survive
Tactically
and
Operationally
y—Win
Strategically**

ANFAR SYSTEMOLOGY

Adaptive Tenets

Strategic Operations: Anfar uses IO and special operations to deter and/or limit outside involvement in the Anfar-Azeri conflict.

Exclusion: Anfar uses IO, IW, and special operations to preclude or limit US/coalition establishment of logistic or C2 sites for operations against Anfar.

Limiting: Anfar targets APOD/SPOD sites in Georgia and Azerbaijan with long-range precision fires, special operations, and IW to deny or disrupt the use of assets crucial for supporting US/coalition deployment into the AOR.

Shielding: Anfar uses dispersion, deception, sophisticated ambushes, as well as complex and urban terrain to neutralize US/coalition ISR and long-range precision strikes.


Force Preservation: Anfar uses complex terrain, limited maneuver and engineer operations to hide and disperse key equipment and C2 nodes. Extensive use of C5D2 to degrade US/coalition ISR and hamper its long-range targeting effort.

Recon Fires: Anfar uses precision fires from dispersed locations to attack key US C3, ISR, and logistic nodes.

Mobile Strike: Anfar strikes US/coalition forces when and where

ADAPTIVE APPLICATIONS

Anfar high value military capabilities disperse and “hug” refugee camps, international organizations, mosques, hospitals . . .



Infantry and Engineers establish defenses in complex terrain

Mechanized / Armored units, supported by artillery and rockets, transition from rapid offensive operations to dynamic, multi-dimensional operations



ADAPTIVE APPLICATIONS



GPS and electronic jammers are employed to shield forces

**Azeri insurgents & dissidents
- leveraged, trained, and
prepared to conduct direct
action**



**Local citizens /reservists
are organized and trained
to report enemy troop
movements and
dispositions**

ADAPTIVE APPLICATIONS



Special Purpose Forces target and take direct action against reserves, communications, LOCs, airfields . . . and other high payoff targets

Long Range - High Altitude sophisticated Air Defense systems are dispersed and hidden throughout Anfar and Nagorno-Karabakh



Mobile TBMs and Cruise Missiles postured to be prepared to strike critical targets



Road To War

**NKILLO incursion
into Nagorno-
Karabakh
against Anfar**

**Anfar begins
IO campaign**

**15 Aug
2001**

**Iranian Forces, w /
Anfar Bde massing
on the Azeri Border
for annual exercise**

**1 Sept
2001**

**Azeri's
capture Anfar
SPF in
support of
the
insurgents.**

Oct 2001

**NKILLO in
contact with
Azeri forces**

1 July 2001

**Azeri Govt warns
the international
community (UN)
that it is unable to
control internal
situation.**

**FDO - Reorient ISR
assets into the
Caspian Region**

**FDO - SAG and
MEU/MPSRON to
Black Sea**

**20 Oct
2001**

**FDO - Move
Air Def, AEF
and ISR
platforms to
Incirlik**

**USNCA
activates CJTF
HQ**

**Position SOF
Coalition
Support Teams
with Azeri
forces**

**Theater &
Corps
Enablers
given
WARNORD**

**FDO - Intensify PSYOP in the
area.**

FDO - CVBG to the Eastern Med

**FDO - SOF increases OPTEMPO
of CINC TEP**

**FDO - CMO conducting area/site
surveys for HNS.**

**FDO - Log Exercise in the Black Sea
littoral**

**FDO - APS from Diego Garcia to
Black Sea**

Road To War

Anfar attacks with OSCs in the North and South to seize Baku oilfields

1 Nov 2001

Azeri Govt requests international military assistance.

3 Nov 2001

US forces begin Air/SPF Attacks

US Forces given OPORD

Anfari forces reach initial objectives and assume defensive positions due to air campaign.

2001

Terrorist attacks against SPODs/LOCs

20 Dec 2001

30 Dec 2001

CJTF 1 deploys V Corps, 1AD, 101 ABN, MEF into Azerbaijan

OSCs begin operations against US forces

1 Jan 2002


1AD and 101st ABN occupy TAAs




ANFAR attacks to seize initial objectives

Assessment

ANFAR 5th OSC has seized objectives vicinity of Agdam. Attack stopped along D+5 line of advance due to JTF airstrikes and international pressure. Postured in the defense to retain oilfields.



Dispositions (Jan 02)



REPUBLIC OF ANFAR ANNOUNCED END STATE

- Internationally recognized political control of NK
- Share in the economic benefits of the BTC pipeline
- Retribution for Turkish / Azeri genocide
- Strengthen Iranian partnership
- Access to Black Sea ports through the Baku-Tbilisi-LOC



**Anfar
Genocide**



OPFOR Assessment Of BLUFOR COAs

- Re-establish Azeri control of NK
- Regain territory lost to Anfar
 - Control resources, ensure continued access to Caspian oil
- Force Anfar forces back within recognized borders
- Limit BLUFOR casualties